Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)
Ludwig
Wittgenstein, the Austrian-born British philosopher,[1]
was certainly one of the more enigmatic and creative thinkers of the twentieth
century. Even though his work has
significantly affected the work of the Continental philosophy that was to
follow him, Wittgenstein is often regarded as an Anglo-American philosopher.[2] This is due to his perspective regarding the proper
form and function of philosophy. For
Wittgenstein the task of philosophy is more a matter of logical critique than
the development of metaphysical systems.
This point is made explicit by Paul Moser and Dwayne Mulder in their
book Contemporary Approaches to
Philosophy:
According to Wittgenstein, the
task of philosophy is to uncover false analogies in our language that lead to
errors and prompt “philosophical” uneasiness and confusion. The task requires an overcoming of our will
or desire to see things in a familiar, common way. It requires that we see things differently,
not that we acquire new knowledge about abstruse matters.[3]
It should be apparent that this view
of philosophy is very similar to that of Russell’s “logical atomism” and Ayer’s
“logical positivism.”[4] Indeed, Wittgenstein’s method for philosophy
bears the distinctive mark of analytic philosophy. For example, he emphasizes that the
clarification of human language, and not the construction of metaphysical
systems, provides the solution to philosophical conundrums. While the quote above provides initial
insight into Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical inquiry, an examination
of his work is necessary in order to develop a better understanding of his
endeavor.
Wittgenstein’s
work mainly consists of two major texts: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (the only work of Wittgenstein’s
published during his lifetime) and the posthumously-published Philosophical Investigations.[5] Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical
investigation is complex and is generally regarded as having developed in two
distinctive phases[6]
that correspond with the texts mentioned above.
Philosophical Investigations represents
the later period of Wittgenstein’s thought, and will be the focus of this
section.
For Wittgenstein
the task of philosophy is grammatical.[7] Rather than creating a metaphysical system,
the philosopher’s main task is “the uncovering of one or another piece of plain
nonsense” that results due to the metaphysical misuse of language.[8] Thus philosophical problems are akin to the
phenomenon of being lost.[9] Ultimately, for Wittgenstein the main purpose
of philosophy is to clarify the confusions that occur in language and
ultimately to do away with the necessity for philosophical speculation
altogether:
It is not our aim to refine or
complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is
indeed complete clarity. But this simply
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is the one which makes me
capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives
philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring
itself in question…[10]
In
order to accomplish this, according to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, one must transform the way that one
views language. The central problem is
that those engaged in philosophic inquiry view language as a means to access
the “hidden essence” of the entities to which it refers. This in turn leads to speculation regarding
the essence of language itself and the expectation that this essence can be
discovered once and for all:
We are under the illusion that what
is peculiar, profound, essential, in our investigation, resides in trying to
grasp the incomparable essence of language.
That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word,
proof, truth, experience, and so on.
This order is a super-order between – so to speak – super-concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words “language”,
“experience”, and “world” , have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of
the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”.[11]
For Wittgenstein, language is
better understood as a game. Each word
may be looked at as a game-piece which has meaning and use-value only in the
context of the current language-game being played.[12] Just as a pawn would appear senseless or
without use in the absence of chessboards, the pieces of language appear
useless without context. Once one has a
better understanding of how language functions in context, or how the language-games
are played, one’s perspective of reality must inevitably be clearer. Thus, for Wittgenstein, philosophy consists
in the refinement of the “rules”[13]
which govern our “language-games,”[14]
and ends with its own obsolescence.
Wittgenstein was
not alone in holding this perspective.
A number of other philosophers developed similar ideas regarding the
nature and purpose of philosophy. One
such philosopher is J. L. Austin. An
analysis of the work and philosophy of Austin, focusing on his text Other Minds, will provide the central
focus of the next section.
II. John Langshaw Austin
(1911-1960)
In
a manner similar to Wittgenstein, the Oxford-educated J.L. Austin displays a
propensity to focus his philosophical analysis upon human language and its
use. For Austin, philosophy also
consists of an analysis and clarification of grammatical form. Though Austin does not think that philosophic
problems are merely the result of the disjunction caused by the metaphysical
use of ordinary language, his position is that problems in philosophy occur due
to ambiguities within the vernacular.
This is why he introduces his text Other
Minds with a detailed discussion of the possibility of knowledge and what
it means to know particular things in particular instances.[15]
Austin points out
that whenever one states that one possesses knowledge of a particular subject,
a number of possible questions emerge as to the nature of the knowledge claimed.[16] For instance, one may claim knowledge regarding
the best way to grow grapes and be met with an immediate retort as to how one
has such knowledge. The first person may
then respond in a number of different ways in accordance to the nature and
certainty of the knowledge possessed (e.g. ‘I grew up on a vineyard’ or ‘I
studied vineyard husbandry at an agricultural school’).[17] Also, one may perform a certain type of
speech act and expect a particular response depending upon a number of factors
relating to one’s context and position. For instance, I may give an order to someone,
but unless I am in a position of authority over them and they have appropriate
understanding as to how this relationship functions, my order may be very
ineffective.[18] Austin provides examples in order to remind
the reader that concepts like knowledge are contextual and depend on the rules,
persons and situations surrounding their use in language to give them meaning.
Overall, Austin’s
method is implicitly revealed as his analysis in Other Minds is dominated by an interest in how language functions
with regard to philosophical claims. For
Austin, much like Wittgenstein, the philosopher’s project should be
characterized by an analysis of concepts, words and phrases in relation to
their use in ordinary language. This is
why Austin uses examples that are more likely to occur in regular parlance than
in a philosophical seminar (e.g. the question regarding knowledge of the
bittern at the bottom of the garden).[19]
The fact that
Austin focuses on an analysis of ordinary language and ordinary situations also
reveals the primacy that Austin’s philosophy gives to “sense-statements,” or statements
about physical reality. The absence of
any reference to subjects like ontology is an indication of Austin’s lack of
interest in metaphysical inquiry. Indeed,
he suggests entertaining metaphysical questions is “the original sin…by which
the philosopher casts himself out from the garden of the world we live in.”[20] What is important is reality as it is
perceived through the senses, and developing a clear understanding regarding how
we may speak of it. The task of
philosophy, as Austin shows by example, is to provide clarity regarding the use
of language and to eliminate ambiguities that result due to vernacular
disjunction. Austin appears to be
following in practice the statement with which Wittgenstein ended his Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak,
thereof one must remain silent.”[21]
III. Analysis
There
seems to be one main point of contact between the philosophic methods developed
and employed by Wittgenstein and Austin.
Both of these thinkers assert, either explicitly or implicitly, that the
task of philosophy is to help clarify ambiguities that occur due to a vague or
mistaken use of language. Wittgenstein
and Austin both remind their readers that language is contextual and can be
properly understood only when one places words and phrases within their proper
context. For Wittgenstein this means
that one must use philosophy to develop sound “rules” for the “language-games”
that one encounters. Austin instead
speaks of placing words and parts of speech within proper “formulas” for them
to have meaning. While the philosophies
of these two thinkers are expressed using different terminology, the core of
their approach to philosophic method appears to be similar in its focus on the
clarification of language.
The
ideas of both Wittgenstein and Austin possess significant insight. Language and philosophy are often plagued by
an idealism that results when words and concepts are removed from ordinary
context. Those interested in philosophic
inquiry are frequently distracted by words like “mind,” “truth,” “world,” “mortality,”
and “heart,” supposing that these words possess more essential meaning than
other parts of language. This is not to
say that some words do not possess more communicative value than others, but
that these words cannot stand on their own.
Words like “truth” always require a context.
Another
interesting concept suggested by the philosophies of Austin and Wittgenstein is
more pragmatic. If words do not help one
communicate, one should examine the words to determine the origin of
miscommunication. One may ask whether or
not parts of speech in question are out of context, or whether a part of speech
only possesses apparent meaning. Whether
or not one is in total agreement with the analyses of these philosophers it
must be admitted that an examination of language is helpful in avoiding
miscommunication. There are certainly
pieces of language that are given unnecessary authority and should be
reexamined.
Sources
Cited
Audi, Robert
“Wittgenstein, Ludwig” in The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, ed. (New York: CUP,
1999).
Austin, J. L.
“Other Minds,” in Philosophical Papers
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1961).
Cohen, Martin Philosophical Tales (Oxford, England:
Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
Garver, Newton
“Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations: Clarity Versus Pretension”in The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader’s Guide, eds. Jorge
J.E. Garcia, Gregory M. Reichberg, and Bernard N. Schumacher (Oxford, England:
Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
Moser, Paul and Dwayne Mulder eds. “Anglo-American
Philosophy,” in Contemporary Approaches
to Philosophy, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994).
Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations: 3rd Edition, (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1968).
http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav-com.html
- this is an online annotated version of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
[1]
“Wittgenstein, Ludwig” in The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, ed. Robert Audi (New
York: CUP, 1999), 976.
[2]
“Anglo-American Philosophy,” in Contemporary
Approaches to Philosophy, eds. Paul Moser and Dwayne Mulder (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), 79.
[3]
Ibid., 79.
[4]
It must be noted, however, that while Wittgenstein’s interest in the analysis
of language is similar to the logical positivists, he did not agree with them
entirely. In fact, Wittgenstein famously
displayed his disagreement with the famous Vienna Circle at a lecture he was to
deliver for them on the scientific approach to knowledge. Instead of giving the lecture he read a
mystical poem with his back turned to them.
Only after he had finished reading the poem did he turn to them and tell
them that philosophy is approached most efficaciously through poetry. Martin Cohen Philosophical Tales (Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing, 2008),
215.
[5] “Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: Clarity Versus Pretension” by Newton
Garver in The Classics of Western
Philosophy: A Reader’s Guide, eds. Jorge J.E. Garcia, Gregory M. Reichberg,
and Bernard N. Schumacher (Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 546.
[6] The idea that Wittgenstein’s thought can be
easily divided into two distinctive periods is now a point of contention. With the publication of the texts generally
referred to as The Blue and Brown Books,
Philosophical Grammar, Philosophical Remarks, and Conversations with the Vienna Circle has
led a number of scholars to acknowledge that there is indeed an extant body of
work that sheds light upon a transitionary period in Wittgenstein’s
thought. “Wittgenstein, Ludwig” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,
2nd edition, ed. Robert Audi (New York: CUP, 1999), 997.
[7]
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations: 3rd Edition, (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1968), 43 (line 90).
[8]
Ibid., 48 (line 119).
[9]
Ibid., 49 (line 123).
[10]
Ibid., 51 (line 133).
[11]
Ibid., 44 (line 97).
[12]
Ibid., 47 (line 108).
[13]
Ibid., 50 (line 125).
[14]
Ibid., 50 (line 130).
[15]
J. L. Austin, “Other Minds,” in Philosophical
Papers (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1961), 44-62.
[16]
Ibid., 45, 47.
[17]
Ibid., 47.
[18]
Ibid., 70.
[19]
Ibid., 47.
[20]
Ibid., 58.
[21]
http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav-com.html
- this is an online annotated version of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
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