I. Introduction
The work of
British-American philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre[1]
is considerably provocative.
Regrettably, much of the disagreement surrounding his work is the result
of misunderstanding. Kelvin Knight makes
this point in the introduction to the MacIntyre
Reader:
Revolutionary or communitarian, ethical and
sociological: the most evident characteristic of Alasdair MacIntyre’s work is
its provocativeness. Unfortunately, the
controversy that it has provoked is often ill-informed.[2]
Knight later notes that a great
deal of this confusion begins when people read the critical portion of
MacIntyre’s work, while neglecting his constructive work.[3] In other words, the tendency is to focus on
MacIntyre’s critique of Enlightenment philosophy and Modernity and to ignore
his reformulation of Aristotelian ethics.[4] Both aspects of his position must be
considered in order to fully comprehend MacIntyre’s philosophic perspective.
II. The Critical Aspect of
MacIntyre’s Philosophy
The very fact that
MacIntyre’s work has two apparently divergent tendencies says much about his
philosophic method. In fact, he would
not view the two aspects of his philosophical work as being entirely distinct. Rather, he would state that the critical
portion of his inquiry is a necessary condition for the positive aspect of his
work. In his view, philosophical
projects are often flawed because they are static and remain closed to truths
presented by other philosophies. He
asserts that it is an error for any theory to remain closed off from other
aspects of philosophical questioning. While
discussing his early work in an interview with Giovanna Borradori, MacIntyre makes
this point clear:
When I look back on my asserted
beliefs in that period, I see my thinking as having been a clumsily patched
together collection of fragments. And
for years this vision was felt as a very disquieting one. Nonetheless, I was able to effect a
reconciliation. The history of late
nineteenth-century physics and the problems that Maxwell and Boltzman faced
when confronted by inconsistencies they could not know how to remove, convinced me that a premature regimentation
of one’s thought in the interest of total consistency may well lead to the
rejection of important truths.[5]
(emphasis added)
Grasping central truths is more
important for MacIntyre than prematurely creating a uniform “system of truth,” which
he asserts was a fundamental flaw of the Enlightenment and Modernity.[6] One must deal with philosophic tension
appropriately or no progress in philosophy is possible. This is the lesson which he has learned from
his own philosophical evolution.
According to
MacIntyre, philosophic disquiet is produced by the realization that many concepts
proposed by different philosophies are untranslatable[7]
because they are the products of different philosophic traditions.[8] These philosophies are “in contention” and
contention is “neither only a rational debate between rival principles nor a
clash of rival social structures, but always inseparably both.”[9] In other words, part of the philosopher’s
task is to point out areas of tension and dismantle illegitimate systems of
thought.[10] MacIntyre asserts that the Enlightenment and
the Modernist philosophical standpoint which it produced are examples of flawed
philosophical perspectives.[11]
III. The Problem of Relativism
Before discussing
the constructive element of MacIntyre’s work, it is important to note the results
of his critical approach. MacIntyre
locates the origin of the current moral crisis known as relativism within the
Enlightenment project itself. He asserts
that the Enlightenment’s attempt to create a universal ethical code based on
reason alone and to sever ethics from tradition has resulted in historicism and
relativism.[12] These two philosophic perspectives often
result from the realization that philosophical systems are, in many respects,
the products of particular social and linguistic contexts,[13]
and that these perspectives hold conflicting versions of truth. Here one witnesses the importance of
MacIntyre’s concept of philosophical contention.
According to
MacIntyre, Modernism allows for two responses in the face of this
realization. One is the relativist
position which asserts that each individual may make truth claims according to
one’s fiat. The other is to attempt to
transcend the modernist understanding of truth.
Of these responses, MacIntyre finds the latter more tenable. In the interview with Borradori, this is why
he privileges the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and asserts that he should have
ended his book A Short History of Ethics with
his discussion of Nietzsche’s work.[14] Recognizing that Nietzsche favors a project
of moral and epistemological transcendence, MacIntyre suggests that there was
not much progress in Western philosophy after Nietzsche.[15] While moral philosophy did not go on hiatus,
not much original thought was produced in the realm of ethical inquiry. Following Nietzsche, philosophers appear to
formulate various ethical positions rather than accepting the relativist void
underlying the Enlightenment project:
Nietzsche occupies this position
insofar as he represents the ultimate
answer to the systematic inconclusiveness and irreconcilable disagreements that
were the outcome of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment moral philosophy. The Enlightenment’s central project had been
to identify a set of moral rules, equally compelling to all rational
persons. That project had failed and its
heirs were a number of rival standpoints, Kantian, utilitarian, contractualist,
and various blends of these whose disagreements multiplied in such a way that
twentieth-century culture has been deprived of any widely shared, rational
morality, but has inherited instead an amalgam of fragments from past moral
attitudes and theories.[16]
(emphasis added)
MacIntyre, however, is not content
to let Nietzsche have the final word. On
the contrary, while MacIntyre recognizes the accuracy of the Nietzschean
critique and the ethical historicism of R. G. Collingwood,[17]
he also sees a potential for philosophy to move beyond this impasse. In this respect, MacIntyre’s work represents
the constructive aspect of his philosophic project.
IV. The Constructive Aspect of
MacIntyre’s Philosophy
To say that
MacIntyre’s philosophic project simply moves beyond the impasse created by the
Nietzschean critique of Modernity is partially misleading. MacIntyre does not view philosophical
historicism and relativism as entirely negligible.[18] Rather, he sees them as necessary starting
points for any contemporary philosophic project.[19] According to MacIntyre, it is necessary to
incorporate an awareness of the historicity of philosophical perspectives in
order to make progress in one’s inquiries.[20] Additionally, ethics and philosophy cannot be
abstract. Gordon Reddiford and William
Watts Miller point out that one of MacIntyre’s basic complaints about modern
ethics is that scholars often act “as if philosophy can declare its independence
from the world and get to and from first principles in a realm of pure,
universal reason.”[21] For MacIntyre, proper philosophical inquiry
must take place within a tradition.[22] Even rational inquiry must begin “from some
contingent historical starting point.”[23] Ultimately, MacIntyre’s philosophical project
aims to recover an ethical perspective rooted in a tradition that has proven to
be rationally consistent according to its own standards and has repeatedly
withstood philosophical criticism throughout its history.[24] Consequently, the positive aspect of
MacIntyre’s philosophical work consists of an attempt to locate the most
resilient philosophic tradition and formulate ethical positions that function
according to the standards of that tradition. This is what leads MacIntyre to embrace and
reformulate the “virtue ethics” of Aristotle.[25] For MacIntyre, philosophy is the discipline
which allows one to adjudicate between rival philosophies. Insofar as it does this, it enables one to
approach truth.
II. Analysis
MacIntyre’s
philosophical method is decidedly more historical than most of the Anglo-American
philosophers who preceded him. However,
it is interesting to note some of the similarities between his work and some of
the other thinkers in Anglo-American philosophy. Like C. I. Lewis, MacIntyre asserts the
importance of not holding contradictory beliefs. Secondly, MacIntyre’s insistence that truth
most be rooted in a tradition is similar to the claims of the ordinary language
philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. These philosophers insist that philosophical
problems arise when the language employed to make truth claims and propositions
is removed from the realm of ordinary language.
In other words, philosophic problems are located at the point where the
language used in analysis is removed from its linguistic tradition. Thirdly, MacIntyre’s philosophy also bears a
striking resemblance to the philosophical perspective of Emmanuel Levinas. While MacIntyre does not employ obscure and
erudite language, his focus on ethical philosophy would no doubt be appreciated
by Levinas. Finally, like Alain Badiou, MacIntyre
claims that truth is not abstract but requires personal engagement.
Ultimately, the
importance of MacIntyre’s philosophy resides in the originality of his main
thesis. A superficial reading of his
work might lead to the conclusion that his position leads to philosophical
relativism; however, this is not the case.
He does not deny the possibility of truth. As he points out in his essay “Moral
Relativism, Truth and Justification,” “[s]uccessful enquiry terminates then in
truth.”[26]
He does, however, acknowledge that different philosophic traditions present
contentious concepts of truth, and one must discern which of these competing
claims is the most sustainable according to the standards of rational
inquiry. This aspect of his philosophy
is what distinguishes MacIntyre from the philosophical schools of Modernity. Rather than deny the potency of the
relativist position,[27]
he acknowledges it and incorporates its criticism into his philosophic project.
Works
Cited
Kelvin Knight, The MacIntyre Reader (Notre Dame ,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).
“MacIntyre,
Alasdair,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy: Second Edition, ed. Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
“An Interview
with Giovanna Borradori” in The MacIntyre
Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1998).
“An Interview for
Cogito,” in The MacIntyre Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).
“Moral
Relativism, Truth and Justification,” in The
MacIntyre Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1998).
[1]
“MacIntyre, Alasdair,” in The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy: Second Edition, ed. Robert Audi (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 526.
[2]
Kelvin Knight, The MacIntyre Reader (Notre
Dame , Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 1.
[3]
Ibid., 1.
[4]
Ibid., 1.
[5]
“An Interview with Giovanna Borradori” in The
MacIntyre Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1998), 257.
[6]
Ibid., 261.
[7]
Ibid., 256.
[8]
Ibid., 259.
[9]
Ibid., 259.
[10]
Ibid., 256.
[11]
This is why MacIntyre speaks positively of Giambattista Vico. In the interview with Giovanna Borradori he
states that “Vico reminded us of what the Enlightenment had forgotten, that
rational inquiry, whether about morality or about anything else, continues the
work of, and remains rooted in, prerational myth and metaphor,” and “does not
begin from Cartesian first principles, but from some contingent historical
starting point…”. Ibid., 261.
[12]
Ibid., 261.
[13]
Ibid., 262.
[14]
Ibid., 261.
[15]
Ibid., 261.
[16]
Ibid., 261.
[17]
Ibid., 261.
[18]
While MacIntyre does view the problem of philosophical and moral relativism
with some apprehension, he does not attempt to deny its reality. Unlike most Modernist philosophers, MacIntyre
does not attempt to refute the relativist position, but rather transcend it by
a reconciliation of ethical philosophy with philosophic tradition. In other words, he is interested in healing
the rift created by the Modernist fact-value distinction.
[19]
This is the position from which MacIntyre initiates most of his more important
philosophic work. For instance, his
essay “Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification,” may be seen as an attempt to
answer the challenge of the relativist position. This, at least in part, is also true of the
essay “Notes from the Moral Wilderness.”
Finally, the relativist tension created by philosophies brought into
contention provided MacIntyre with the motivation to write what is arguably his
most important work, “After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.”
[20]
Ibid., 261 – 262.
[21]
“An Interview for Cogito,” in The MacIntyre Reader, Kelvin Knight,
ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 271.
[22]
Ibid., 272 – 273.
[23]
“An Interview with Giovanna Borradori” in The
MacIntyre Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1998), 261.
[24]
Ibid., 263.
[25]
“Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification,” in The MacIntyre Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed., (Notre Dame , Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 202 -220.
[26]
Ibid., 207.
[27]
Many philosophers who persist in their defense of the Modernist philosophic and
ethical project attempt a philosophical regression rather than transcendence in
the face of the relativist challenge. In
other words they hope to recover some missing piece which makes pure, rational
inquiry coherent again. Examples of this include the philosophies of Leo
Strauss (see The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the
Thought of Leo Strauss especially the essays “Relativism” and “Progress or
Return?”) and James F. Harris (see Against Relativism: A Philosophic Defense of
Method).
No comments:
Post a Comment